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DO PROFESSORS NEED
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AS MUCH
AS DOCTORS AND LAWYERS?
James W. Nickel
University of Colorado
2 ---------------------------------
University faculty have not given much
attention to ethical issues in teaching and research.
There is a large literature on academic freedom, but
little on academic responsibilities.! No journals are
devoted to ethical issues in academic life, and no one
teaches courses to graduate students aspiring to
academic careers about their responsibilities as
teachers and researchers. In contrast, medical ethics
is an established area of moral and political inquiry.
There is a large literature on medical ethics, with a
number of journals dedicated to it. Many medical
schools have increased their offerings in medical
ethics, and many hospitals now have "ethics
committees." The situation in law is similar. The
ABA has codes of ethics for lawyers and judges.2
Law schools are required to offer courses in legal
ethics. And a substantial literature exists on the
ethical dimensions of lawyering.
It is tempting to view the relative neglect of
ethical issues in university teaching and research as
stemming from the professional arrogance and
hypocrisy of university professors.3 Arrogance
might be seen in the implicit assumption that the
ethical standards of university faculty are sufficiently
good that they call for no special attention.
Hypocrisy might be seen in the willingness of
professors--particularly philosophy professors--to
write about legal and medical ethics while neglecting
academic ethics. But this is only one possible
explanation of why academic ethics has not received
the same attention that legal and medical ethics have.
In the fIrst part of this paper I consider a number of
possible explanations for this neglect As part of this
I will raise the question of whether academic ethics
deserves more attention. My conclusions will be that
the lack of attention by academics to ethical issues in
their professions is not as self-serving as it initially
seems, but that academic ethics is an area where
intellectual and cultural development is needed. The
second part of this paper offers a framework for
understanding and developing academic ethics
II
WHAT EXPLAINS THE RELATIVE NEGLECf
OF ACADEMIC ETHICS?
There are a number of possible explanations of why
academic ethics has not received as much attention as
medical and legal ethics. In this section I present and
evaluate these explanations. It is possible, of course,
that two or more of them working in tandem provide
the best explanation.
A. Faculty are self-serving in ignoring
ethical question in their own profession. This
explanation, which I referred to in the introduction,
holds that the neglect of academic ethics by
university faculty is best explained as a matter of
serving their own interests in a hypocritical way.
When a similar lack of attention to ethical issues
existed in medicine and law, many academics were
quick to attribute this to the professional arrogance
and hypocrisy of doctors and lawyers. Perhaps this
was a matter of seeing slivers in the eyes of doctors
and lawyers while being blind to the logs in their
own eyes. President Diether Haenicke of Western
Michigan University recently expressed this view:
It has, in my observation, been a long-
standing practice of the academic
professoriate to lecture others, but to refrain
from lecturing its own constituency. I have
not yet seen any of our colleagues lecture
about ethics in academia. If there is a need
for a reconsideration of ethical questions in
the professions, why spare our own?3
No doubt there is some truth in viewing professors
as hypocritical on issues of faculty ethics, but some
of the ways in which it is an oversimplification will
emerge as other possible explanations are
considered.
B. Academics have not experienced a crisis
in public confidence. The Watergate scandals caused
a considerable amount of public concern about the
ethics of lawyers, since President Nixon and several
of those involved in the scandals were lawyers.
Skyrocketing medical costs, and a consumer
rebellion against imperious physicians, stimulated
public concern about the policies and ethical
standards appropriate to medical care. Public
concern directed to academics and their appropriate
roles has never been this strong. There has been no
similar crisis in public confidence concerning the
ways in which university faculty go about their
work.
C. There has been less technological change
in the university than in medicine. In the last fifty
years, medicine has been substantially transformed
by technological advances. New methods of dealing
with health problems--from heart transplants to in
vitro fertilization--have raised difficult issues about
whether these methods are morally permissible,
whether they are affordable, and how they should be
distributed. It has been recognized that these issues
should be addressed not only by doctors but also by
intellectuals and by the public, with the result that
many professors have written and taught about them.
Technological change has not affected
lawyers and professors to a similar degree.
Universities have enlarged and changed in many
ways during the last fifty years, but this change has
generally not been driven by technological advances.
The area where this is most true is in teaching.
Things like adding more seats to the room or
substituting an overhead projector for a blackboard
haven't transformed the nature of teaching.
Research, on the other hand, has been substantially
changed by sophisticated technology. The
equipment used in experiments has become
immensely more complicated in many areas,with the
result that researchers must devote a lot of time and
energy fmding funds for their research. And almost
all researchers have come to rely on computers for
gathering and processing data and for writing up
their results. But this change in university research
has not raised as many moral and political issues as
technology-driven change in medicine.
D. The consequemces of academic
malpractice are less grave than those of legal or
medical malpractice. To overstate things a little,
when doctors are incompetent or behave badly their
patients die, and when lawyers are incompetent or
behave badly their clients go to jail or lose their
cases. But when professors are incompetent or
behave badly their students merely are taught less
well than they might have been, or knowledge is not
advanced as much as it might have been. Because of
this difference in the consequences of misconduct, it
has seemed less imperative to focus concern on the
ethical problems of acaddemics. There is also an
exception to this that proves the rule. In areas where
there are clear victims of academic malpractice,
namely human and animal research subjects that are
abused, regulations have been developed.
E. The temptations of professors aren't as
large or enticing as those of doctors and lawyers. H
a doctor does three or four unnecessary surgeries a
month, the return from these operations in the course
of a year might be an extra $100,000. And if a
lawyer can save a shady but profitable enterprise
from prosecution or conviction, the rewards may be
enormous. Professors, on the other hand, mostly
work in an environment in which there are only small
temptations present, things like going to a conference
in New York because one wants to enjoy a weekend
in the Big Apple, or getting even with an insolent
student by giving her an undeservedly low grade.
These temptations, along with other ones such as
taking shortcuts in grading, not keeping up with
one's subject, or going skiing when one should be
doing research, are not to be belittled, but as
instances of human vice and folly they are not
extremely grave.4
All of these explanations are at least partly
persuasive. Probably each of them has a part to play
in a complete explanation of why academic ethics has
received less attention than medical and legal ethics.
The claim that professional ethics is more important
for doctors and lawyers than for professors has some
truth in it. If this is correct, then the lack of attention
to academic ethics may be less self-serving and
hypocritical than it initially seemed.
It does not follow from this, however, that
the subject of faculty ethics does not deserve more
attention that it has received. To show that A is more
important than B is not to show that B is
unimportant. And we should not misconstrue the
last two explanations to conclude that the moral
universe of the teacher-researcheris morally trivial.
More attention to ethical issues in teaching
and research is indeed needed. If abuses by faculty
members are not generally so serious as to count as
felonies or so dangerous as to do severe harm to
others, perhaps this means that a code of academic
ethics need not be an imitation of the criminal law.
Perhaps in formulating an academic ethic, we can
give a bigger role to aspirations or goals and a
smaller one to prohibitions and punishments.
ill
A FRAMEWORKFOR UNDERSTANDING
ACADEMICETIIICS
In this section I introduce a number of
distinctionspertaining to the nature and role of a code
of professional ethics. These distinctions will be
used in the following section to present a general
descriptionof a plausible code of academic ethics.
A. Ethics and codes of ethics It is important
to avoid confusing the ethics of a profession with its
written ethical code. The relation between knowing
how to speak a language and having a written
grammar for that language is probably a good
analogy. Just as good speakers commonly have no
adequate written formulation of their competency,
ethically admirable professionals may have no
adequate formulation of the standards they live by.
Patterns of ethical behavior are often taught by
example rather than by elaborate precepts. The
operation of standards of behavior may not be
apparent to those doing the behaving, just as the
rules of grammar that describe an excellent speaker's
competencymay not be known to the speaker.
The idea of a written code of conduct for a
profession, however, is far from new. This idea has
been exemplified in medicine for over two thousand
years. And lawyers have had written codes of ethics
during the two centuries. Although university
faculty could profit from a well formulated and
implemented ethical code, the analogy with
formulating a grammar should remind us of the
difficulty of constructing a code that is adequate in
representing the operative ethical standards of a
profession.
B. Possible goals of codes of professional
ethics A code of professional ethics can focus on:
1. Minimal standards or disciplinary rules
These are standards whose violation can get one
dismissed, defrocked or disbarred.
2. Standards of reasonable performance
These identify the kind of performance that make a
person worth hiring or keeping as a professional.
3. Standards of truly excellent performance
These identify performance that realizes our
aspirations and ideals, that qualifies one for
recognition and awards.
4. Important &eneral principles and &oals
These guide behavior in areas that are not covered by
familiar patterns of practice or by existing codes of
ethics. They may express what a profession takes its
central purposes to be.
A code setting out minimal standards and a
code setting out general principles and goals would
be very different documents. It isn't clear which of
the four things listed a code of academic ethics
should attempt to do. It is possible, of course, to
attempt to do two or more of these things in a single
code.
c. General and specialized norms The
behavior of university faculty is guided both by the
general mores or norms of society as well as by the
specific norms of university faculty and their
disciplines. By "norm" I mean to cover all kinds of
standards, prescriptions, rules, principles and goals.
A general norm, such as the prohibition of theft,
applies to everyone in society. A specialized norm,
such as a prohibition of inventing experimental data,
applies only--or mainly--to people whose study or
work involves scientific experimentation. One might
expect that a code of professional ethics for a
discipline would include no general norms, that it
would consist entirely of specialized norms focused
on the work of that discipline. This, however, is too
simple a view, since the violation of certain general
norms may be especially tempting to members of a
particluar profession. Thus we need three categories:
1. General norms that require no special
emphasis in connection with a particular profession
Codes of professional ethics for lawyers do not
generally include prohibitions of murder. Everyone
has the duty not to murder, and experience has not
shown lawyers to be especially tempted or inclined to
murder. Thus there is no good reason to include this
norm in a code of ethics for lawyers.
2. General norms that need special emphasis
in connection with a Particluar profession Everyone
has the duty to avoid fraud, but perhaps accountants
are especially likely to be tempted to commit fraud
given the nature of the work they do. They may be
tempted, for example, to help their clients gain bank
loans by preparing fraudulent statements of net
worth. If this is correct, then it would be appropriate
to include in an ethical code for accountants a
prohibition of fraud. Special temptations, however,
are not the only reason for connecting a general norm
with a particluar profession. A general norm might
be included in a profession's ethics code because it
expresses the distinctive values of that group.
3. Specialized norms of a particular
profession These norms are unique, or nearly
unique, to a profession. Specialized norms for
lawyers will be mostly different from specialized
norms for professors. These norms pertain to
offenses that only members of a particular profession
can commit because only they have the positions,
powers, privileges or duties that make these offences
possible. For example, a nonn prohibiting false
arrest is a specialized nonn; it only applies to law
enforcement officers and others with the legal power
to make arrests.
It is sometimes difficult to decide whether a
nonn fits in category two or category three. This
may depend on how we describe it. For example, a
prohibition of using someone else's ideas without
attribution may fit in category three if we describe it
as plagiarism, but in category two if we give it the
more general description of theft. This example also
illustrates that some specialized nonns apply to more
than one profession. A nonn forbidding plagiarism
might be appropriate to professional codes for
professors and journalists, but not to codes for
accountants or doctors.
IV
APPLYING TIffi FRAMEWORK TO
ACADEMIC ETHICS
The distinctions made in the previous section
raise some questions about how to proceed if we
want to give more attention to academic ethics. The
distinction between ethics and codes of ethics raises
the question of whether developing and
implementing a written code of ethics is the best way
to proceed. The distinctions between four possible
goals of a code of faculty ethics raises the question of
whether we just want standards for disciplining
people who do very badly or whether we want to
include standards of excellent behavior and
aspirations and ideals. And the distinction between
generalized and specialized offences raises the
questions of wheher there are any general offences
that faculty are especially likely to commit and
whether there are specialized offences that are made
possible by the roles, powers, privileges and duties
of university faculty.
If we can answer these questions, then we
will begin to have some idea of what form increased
attention to academic ethics might take. I don't have
space for full responses to these questions, but I'll
offer some brief responses that I think plausible.
A. Do we need a code of ethics for
university faculty? If properly constructed and
applied, a code of ethics for university faculty would
be useful. Such a code could help educate faculty
and students about academic standards and goals,
give department chairs and deans some authoritative
standards to appeal to in dealing with colleagueswho
behave or perform badly, and offer the public some
assurance that ethical issues in university life are
recognized and taken seriously.
The process of deliberating about and
formulating a code of ethics for university faculty
would itself be useful, quite apart from its outcome,
since such deliberation would enrich our intellectual
and cultural resources in this area. This process
might occur at the national level through
organizations such as the AAUP and through
disciplinary associations such as the American
Historical Association. At the local level it might
occur within the faculty organizations of particular
universities.
Our earlier analogy between a written ethical
code and a written grammar reminds us, however,
that people can speak and behave perfectly well
without without having or knowing any written
formulation of their linguistic or moral competency.
Further, an ethical code that is badly formulated or
administered may contribute little or nothing to good
conduct. Constructing and implementing an ethical
code is worth doing only if it can be done well.
The analogy between a written grammar and
a written moral code is misleading in at least one
way, namely that there is probably greater diversity
in moral beliefs and attitudes in Americn universities
than there is diversity in the linguistic patterns of
educated speakers of American English. This
diversity may itself provide a reason why it is
worthwhile to make an effort to formulate common
standards of acceptable conduct.
B. Are there general offences requiring
special emphasis in the university context? I think
that the answer to this question is affirmative.
Sexual harassment is an example of a general offence
that ought to be given attention and emphasis in the
university.5 We might charaterize sexual harassment
as using one's position or influence to induce a
person in a subordinate or less powerful position to
behave in ways one finds sexually gratifying. This
is a general offence since it is possible in almost any
area of life or work. It deserves emphasis in the
university context because students are in a stage of
life in which they are sexually attractive and
interested in relationships and because faculty are
often in a position to take advantage of their role and
power for sexual purposes.
Other general offences might be included not
because they are more likely to occur in a university
but because they connect with the role of the
university or with values that academics emphasize.
One example is a norm prohibiting lying, fraud and
slander. These all involve persuading people of
things that are known by the speaker to be false--and
this type of persuasion is especially inappropriate in
an institution committed to the pursuit of truth and
knowledge. Another example is discrimination
based on race, gender, religion, or social class. This
offence is worth emphasizingg in a code of
university ethics not because faculty are especially
likely to engage in such discrimination, but because it
is especially repugnant in an institution whose
appropriate test for admission is whether someone is
committed to and capable of a quest for knowledge
and, more specifically, committed to and capable of
pursuing the goals of particular disciplines such as
biology or English literature. Michael Walzer put
this as follows: "If the teachers see a likely student,
they take him in. At least, that is the way legendary,
and therefore ideal, teachers behave; they ask none
of the conventional questions about wealth and
status.,,6
C. Specialized offences To see how faculty
life admits of specialized offences we have to inquire
into the position, powers, privileges and duties of
faculty members. This is to ask whether the
distinctiveroles of facultymembersmake available to
them offences that are not available to the general
public. Here we need to remember my earlier
warning that which of these categories an offence fits
into may depend on how abstractly we describe it
One way of conceiving the ethics of a
profession is in terms of preventing abuses of the
distinctive privileges that members of that profession
have. Kenneth Kipnis suggests this view in his
book, Legal Ethics.? Kipnis emphasizes, for
example, the attorney-client privilege of
confidentiality and ways in which it can be abused.
But we should attend not only to the misuse of
professional perogatives, but also to the failure to
meet distinctive professional responsibilities. This
broader approach looks at a profession's special
liberties, powers and rights (the benefit side) and at
its distinctive duties, responsibilities and liabilities
(the burden side).
To follow this approach, we can try to
identify the distinctive privileges and responsibilities
of university faculty members. University faculty
are both teachers and researchers; we can expect
them to share some privileges and responsibilities
with both teachers outside the university (e.g., public
school teachers) and with researchers outside the
universtiy (e.g., researchers working for government
agencies or private firms).
1. Teachin~ The responsibility of the
university teacher is to help students acquire
advanced levels of knowledge and competency. To
provide such help in an effective way, one must have
and maintain an advanced level of competence in
one's field. Keeping up with one's field is often
difficult, and one may be tempted to give up the
struggle. Because of this, a code of faculty ethics
should emphasize the teacher's responsibility to
devote sufficient time to activities such as reading,
laboratory work, research, scholarship, conversing
with colleagues, and attending conferences.
Knowing one's field is not, of course, sufficient.
One also has to be able to communicate this
knowledge or competence to one's students. Here a
code of faculty ethics could emphasize the teacher's
responsibility to acquire and practice effective
teaching procedures.
The privileges of a university teacher include:
(a) having access to people's minds during a
formativeperiod; (b) setting the syllabi and choosing
the texts for one's courses; (c) choosing how to
teach particular class sessions. These privileges can
be abused in a multitude of ways. Among the more
obvious abuses are indoctrination, which we might
characterize as teaching in a way that inculcates
beliefs without exploring the grounds for those
beliefs and possible objections to them. Another is
fosterim~the fonnation of a personality cult, which
we might characterize as glorifying oneself and
slandering colleagues as a means to gratification and
power; a third is divertin~ class sessions away from
the subject of the course to extraneous topics.
2. Research Abuses in teaching have
received more attention than misconduct in research.
There are a number of reasons for this. First, we
have a lot of experience with the teacher-student
relationship; nearly everyone in the United States
has experienced it. The ethical dimensions of this
relationship are consequently more familiar. Second,
research doesn't have built-in observers in the way
that teaching does. Research is a less public activity
than teaching, especially at the moments when crucial
results or data are found. Another way of saying this
is that the teacher is generally much closer to his
clients than the reseacher is. Third, the mythology of
science as value-free has discouraged inquiry into the
ethics of research and kept us from giving full
recognition to the moral and legal dimensions of this
activity. We are beginning, I think, to recognize that
adherence to appropriate values and norms is central
to doing good research. To say the same thing in a
more contentious way, scientific and scholarly
activity presupposes values and norms.
The fact of limited development in this area
should be put together with the fact that research is
often an area of greater pressure than teaching in
university life. In many universities, the academic
game is won or lost in accordance with the success
of one's research. Since we haven't given much
attention to this area, and since it is an area where
faculty are under considerable pressure to succeed,
perhaps it would be wise for academics to devote
some time and energy to it.
We can follow the same strategy in thinking
about the ethics of research that we followed in
discussing the ethics of teaching. We can begin, that
is, by asking whether there are any general moral
principles that ought to be emphasized in this
context, either because of special temptations or
because these principles express something important
about the activity. One principle, which is supported
on both of these counts, is honesty in presenting
one's procedures and results. Researchers are
sometimes tempted to manufacture data, to fudge the
data a little, or to exaggerate its significance. Thus it
would be worth mentioning in a code of research
ethics that scrupulous honesty is required in
communicating one's results.
A second approach to thinking about research
ethics is to ask whether the distinctive powers,
privileges, or responsibilities of a university
professor make it possible for him or her to commit
distinctive sorts of abuses.
Perhaps the most important privilege of a
university professor in regard to research is having
time with pay for doing it. A university faculty
member is given time, and control over that time, so
that he or she can pursue research questions that are
worth answering and that suit his or her abilities and
resources. The abuses here are obvious and familiar.
One abuse is not making effective use of the time one
is paid for, perhaps by spending too much time in the
faculty lounge and too little time in the study, library
or laboratory. Another is diverting this time to
private ends. Here I have in mind something like
using one's afternoons to run a real estate business
or to develop one's skills as a rock climber.
A second privilege of university faculty
members is to conduct their research in an
environment that is fairly free from public scrutiny
and regulation. It is a good idea to insulate the study
or laboratory from extraneous influences so that
researchers can follow their noses and judge on the
basis of what they take to be the best evidence. But
this privilege should not be a license, for example, to
fudge experimental data or to inflict unnecessarypain
on laboratory animals.
A distinctive responsibility of university
researchers is to give a fair amount of credit to others
for their work or ideas. Interestingly, this is a duty
of fairness that, with honesty, is at the heart of
scientific activity. The severest case of failure in
giving fair credit is representing someone else's
work as one's own. This is common enough to have
an ugly name: plagiarism. Milder failures in this
NOTES
respect might involve giving someone else too small
a share of the credit, as when a graduate student
whose ideas are the basis for a paper is relegated to
second author, or giving oneself too much credit, as
when one inflates the importance of one's discovery
or publication in guiding or stimulating subsequent
work.8
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